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THE POWER TO “TRY” “CASES OF IMPEACHMENT”: SOME 
REFLECTIONS ON THE FINALITY, TRANSPARENCY AND 
INTEGRITY OF SENATE ADJUDICATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
IMPEACHMENTS (INCLUDING THAT OF DONALD J. TRUMP) 
BY VIKRAM DAVID AMAR* AND JASON MAZZONE** 
INTRODUCTION
The Senate’s role in conducting impeachment trials is no doubt a com-
plicated one. It is clear (at least we think so) that impeachment proceedings 
are not criminal cases in which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ criminal 
procedural protections themselves apply. Article I of the Constitution explic-
itly provides that “[j]udgment in cases of impeachment shall extend no fur-
ther than to removal from Office [and disqualification from future office] but 
the Party . . . shall . . . be liable and subject to . . . punishment according to 
law.”1 So, an impeachment defendant is never in danger of losing his liberty, 
or even his bank account. Instead, what is at stake is a public-sector job (not 
unlike a dismissal process for revoking tenure of a public law school profes-
sor). The impeachment-judgment clause makes clear the impeachment trial 
is not a mechanism for punishment the way the criminal law is; impeachment 
is primarily a device to enable removal from office of someone who is unfit 
to continue. For that reason, the protections of the Sixth Amendment’s right 
of accused persons to confront witnesses against them (which applies only 
in “criminal prosecutions”) have no direct application to impeachment pro-
ceedings.2
To be sure, some folks who may invoke these amendments may con-
cede that they do not technically apply, but that we should borrow from the 
spirit of the amendments to make impeachment proceedings more fair and 
just. Even if some analogies between impeachment processes and criminal 
* Dean and Iwan Foundation Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. 
** Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. 
 1.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 7. 
 2.  For this reason, our esteemed friend and (for one of us) co-author Steve Calabresi was surely 
wrong in suggesting that the House of Representatives had been violating President Trump’s Sixth 
Amendment rights by not giving him an adequate chance to confront his accusers (including the whistle-
blower). See, e.g., Steve Calabresi, House Democrats Violate the Sixth Amendment by Denying Trump a 
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proceedings were apt—and analogies always require judgment to apply—
the right to confront would not be relevant to the House’s impeachment 
phase since that would be akin to a grand jury indictment (not a trial), and 
accused persons have no Sixth Amendment right to confront in the grand 
jury process.3
Some commentators have focused less on the Sixth Amendment, and 
more on the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy provision.4 Again, an im-
peachment trial risks neither “life” nor “limb,” and is not a criminal proceed-
ing at all, making the double jeopardy provision inapplicable. But does the 
inapplicability of double jeopardy mean, as Neal Katyal has intimated, that 
now that the current Senate has decided not to convict President Trump, if 
he is reelected in 2020 he could be subject to (re)impeachment and (re)trial 
by a new Senate based on the same charges and the same evidence?5
I. SENATE RELITIGATION?
We think not, and indeed are quite skeptical about the constitutional 
propriety of conducting a redo of presidential impeachment proceedings af-
ter an intervening presidential election in which a President is reelected, for 
two reasons. 
First, even though as noted above impeachment trials are not criminal, 
they are nevertheless, under the words of Article I, “cases” in which the Sen-
ate, acting “on Oath or Affirmation” for this purpose, is empowered to “try” 
such matters and reach “judgment[s]” about the individuals who are being 
“tried.”6 Indeed, it is precisely because the Senate is acting as a sort of judi-
cial tribunal in a trial of impeachment that the federal courts (including the 
Supreme Court) should respect the judicial decisions made by the Senate and 
treat the results of impeachment trials as “political questions” ordinarily not 
susceptible to federal judicial review. Just as state and federal courts in the 
United States would respect adjudications made by courts in other countries 
under principles of res judicata, so too they should respect judgments made 
by the Senate sitting as a judicial tribunal in impeachment cases. (This res 
 3.  This is yet another reason that Calabresi’s Sixth Amendment musings are off the mark. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 4.  Amber Phillips, Can Trump be impeached again?, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/06/can-trump-be-impeached-again/ 
[https://perma.cc/3MNK-AQKJ]. 
 5.  See Neal Katyal (@neal_katyal), Twitter (Dec. 5. 2019, 8:22 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/neal_katyal/status/1202594066942353409 [https://perma.cc/R7NN-QKD3] (“Impt note on fu-
ture: If the Senate doesn’t vote to convict Trump . . . he could of course be retried in the new Senate 
should he win re-election. Double jeopardy protections do not apply. And Senators voting on impeach-
ment in the next months know this.”).
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judicata explanation for why impeachment trials are “political questions”—
which focuses on the distinctively judicial character of the constitutional lan-
guage empowering the Senate in impeachment proceedings—helps make 
political question doctrine less subjective and less capacious).7
Of course, even the law of res judicata has nuances and exceptions.8
When a court purports to resolve a matter but never really addresses the mer-
its, then nothing has been adjudicated in a way that must be respected by 
future tribunals.9 This might explain some of what the Supreme Court said 
and did in its 1993 decision in Nixon v. United States,10 the most famous 
Court opinion involving an impeachment case. Judge Walter Nixon was a 
U.S. District Judge in Mississippi who had been criminally convicted—of 
making false statements to a federal grand jury—and sentenced to prison. 
Because, even after his conviction and criminal sentence, he continued to 
hold office as a federal judge, the House of Representatives adopted articles 
of impeachment against him and presented them to the Senate. In turn, the 
Senate, pursuant to its own impeachment rules (specifically, Senate Im-
peachment Rule XI), appointed a Senate committee to receive testimony and 
other evidence and to report back to the whole Senate. After the committee 
had done its work and presented the full Senate with a report and transcript, 
the entire Senate cast ballots, with more than two-thirds (the constitutional 
requirement for conviction) of the senators voting to convict Judge Nixon 
and remove him from judicial office. Thereafter, Nixon filed suit in federal 
district court, arguing that Senate Rule XI violated the Constitution inasmuch 
as Article I of the Constitution gives to the entire Senate, and not just a com-
mittee, the authority to “try” all impeachment cases. In other words, argued 
Nixon, because the entire Senate had not participated in the evidentiary hear-
ings, the Senate had not conducted the trial that the impeachment provisions 
of the Constitution contemplate. After he lost in the lower courts, Nixon 
sought review in the Supreme Court. 
In rejecting Nixon’s challenge, the Court said: “Before we reach the 
merits of [Nixon’s] claim [that the Senate’s actions violate the Impeachment 
 7.  Indeed, as Justice Byron White pointed out, “the issue in the political question doctrine is not
whether the constitutional text commits exclusive responsibility for a particular governmental function to 
one of the political branches. There are numerous instances of this sort of textual commitment, e.g., Art. 
I, § 8, and it is not that disputes implicating these provisions are nonjusticiable. Rather, the issue is 
whether the Constitution has given one of the political branches final responsibility for interpreting the 
scope and nature of such a power.”—in other words, for adjudicating the limits of the power. Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 240 (1993) (White, J., concurring). See Vikram D. Amar, The Senate and 
the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1115 (1988). 
 8.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 9.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
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Trial Clause of Article I], we must decide whether it is ‘justiciable,’ that is, 
whether it is a claim that may be resolved by the [federal] courts. We con-
clude that it is not.”11 This sweeping language in Nixon, characterizing im-
peachment disputes as “[non]justiciable” in the federal courts, has led some 
observers to conclude that the case holds that judicial review of impeachment 
is simply never available. 
But the Nixon Court did not completely live up to its own rhetoric about 
staying out of the merits of impeachment proceedings. While the Court said 
it had no power to look at the legality of Senate Rule XI, the Court went on 
to say that Rule XI is completely consistent with the meaning of the word 
“try” in Article I of the Constitution: “The word ‘try,’ both in 1787 and later, 
has considerably broader meanings than those to which [Mr. Nixon] would 
limit it . . . [W]e cannot say that the Framers used the word ‘try’ as an implied 
limitation on the method by which the Senate might proceed in trying im-
peachments.”12 That language is not the Court staying out; it is the Court 
stepping in and deciding that the Senate has not violated the (Court’s under-
standing of the) text of the Constitution. Saying the Senate has not violated 
the Constitution is not the same thing as saying the Court has no power to 
decide whether the Senate has violated the Constitution. The first is a ruling 
on the merits; only the latter is a true, pure invocation of political question 
doctrine. 
The point was illustrated by a hypothetical posed by Justice Souter in 
an opinion concurring in the judgment in Nixon. He mused: “If the Senate 
were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, con-
victing, say, upon a coin-toss, or upon a summary determination that an of-
ficer of the United States was simply a ‘bad guy,’ . . . judicial interference 
might well be appropriate.”13 Justice Souter’s approach (and that of other 
justices who concurred in the judgment) is not one in which the Court stead-
fastly stays out; it is one in which the Court leans in, but presumably gives a 
great deal of latitude to the Senate (and presumably the House too) on what 
is constitutionally permissible.14 Under this view, perhaps we should not 
think of political question doctrine in the impeachment setting as a yes or no 
determination of whether federal courts can review, but instead think of it 
more in terms of how much deference the Court will afford the political 
branches even if the Court does not stay out of the matter entirely. And even 
though Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Nixon does not 
 11.  Id. at 226. 
 12.  Id. at 229–30. 
 13.  Id. at 253–54 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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explicitly embrace Justice Souter’s approach—and instead purports to adopt 
a bright-line rule of no judicial review—the fact that the majority does opine 
on the meaning of the word “try,” and how the Senate’s definition of that 
word is a permissible one, suggests more agreement with Justice Souter than 
the majority itself acknowledges.15 This language and analysis 
in Nixon might be completely consistent with the res judicata vision of po-
litical question doctrine in the impeachment setting sketched out above. If 
the court of another country resolved disputes by flipping coins, or by simply 
characterizing an accused as a bad guy, without ever going through a coher-
ent process to make findings of particular culpability vel non, perhaps U.S. 
courts would not accord res judicata respect to those decisions. 
But, bringing things back to President Trump’s impeachment, given 
that the senators who voted against conviction determined either that the al-
legations embodied in the articles of impeachment were not sufficiently 
grave to warrant removal at this time,16 or that the allegations (especially as 
regards impermissible motive by the President) lacked adequate proof, then 
those determinations—whether or not supported by the weight of the evi-
dence—might have to be respected by a subsequent Senate, sitting as a judi-
cial tribunal itself in a subsequent case of impeachment.17 Of course, if the 
Senate had decided never to take up the 2019 articles of impeachment before 
the 2020 elections, as it could have if it had wanted,18 then nothing would 
have been adjudged and no results would be treated as res judicata. Or, if 
new important evidence is uncovered after 2020, that too might affect appli-
cation of res judicata, since significant new evidence can sometimes cause 
courts to reopen things already adjudicated in non-impeachment cases.19
Mention of the 2020 elections brings us to the second reason we have 
qualms about re-litigation of impeachment allegations after presidential 
reelection. As the Nixon Court noted (and as is obvious from the structure of 
the Constitution) impeachment powers were lodged in the House and Sen-
ate—and not the federal courts—precisely because removal of high-ranking 
 15.  See id. at 229–30. 
 16.  See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Rubio’s stance). 
 17.  We suppose someone could argue that since President Trump did not receive a 2/3 vote in his 
favor, he was neither acquitted nor convicted, and that his impeachment trial resulted in a “hung” Senate, 
in which case, the argument would continue, nothing was adjudicated. “But in impeachment, when fewer 
than [two-thirds of the] Senators vote to convict, we say the impeached person is acquitted—even though 
67 did not vote against conviction. This has been true from the beginning of the Republic all the way 
through William Rehnquist’s pronouncement that Bill Clinton was acquitted [to the proclamation by 
Chief Justice Roberts that President Trump was acquitted]. It takes 67 to convict, but only 34 to acquit.” 
Vikram David Amar, The Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth about “High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors” and the Constitution’s Impeachment Process,” 16 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 414 (1999). 
 18.  See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
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executive or judicial officers is best done by a body with some electoral ac-
countability.20 Impeachment, and potential removal, of a President is a po-
litical as well as a quasi-judicial process. And if the voters of America, when 
informed of the facts and allegations, decide to reelect a President in spite of 
the evidence already on the table against him, then that is a judgment that 
ought to be afforded tremendous respect by a new Senate as well. 
II. PUBLIC OR SECRET VOTES?
A second entailment of the Senate acting in judicial or quasi-judicial 
capacity when it resolves impeachment cases is how publicly transparent the 
proceedings need be. In some settings, Congress may prefer to keep its ulti-
mate deliberations shielded from public view. But does the general public-
ness of judicial proceedings21 counsel against such secrecy in presidential 
impeachments? We think so. 
In this regard, some commentators have floated that idea that it would 
be permissible and advisable for the Senate sitting in the matter of President 
Trump’s impeachment to adopt a rule of private (that is, unreported to the 
public) voting on the question of whether the President ought to be convicted 
of the articles of impeachment adopted by the House.22 Part of the commen-
tary may have been prompted by reports that former Senator Jeff Flake (R. 
Ariz.) said that “at least 35” GOP senators would vote to remove President 
Trump if the vote were private.23 Whether such a prediction is remotely ac-
curate is hard to know, although it strikes us as unrealistically high given that 
conviction and removal of President Trump with a large number of Repub-
lican votes might be construed as an admission by the party—in an election 
year—that its steadfast support of him up until this point has been illegiti-
mate. 
 20.  Nixon, 506 U.S. at 234–36. 
 21.  In criminal cases, the Constitution explicitly provides for a “speedy and public” trial, U.S.
CONST. amend. VI, but federal judges have also held that federal civil cases in court are, absent excep-
tional circumstances, public affairs, e.g., Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F. 2d 1059 (3d Cir. 
1984). And, of course, in any judicial case requiring unanimity by a jury, a result in either direction 
betrays who voted in its favor—namely, all of the jurors. Moreover, as discussed infra, the precedent in 
impeachment cases leaning in the direction of publicness must also be taken into account. 
 22.  See, e.g., Douglas Kmiec, Trump’s Impeachment Trial Could Use a Secret Ballot, THE HILL
(Jan. 29, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/480294-trumps-impeachment-trial-requires-a-
secret-ballot [https://perma.cc/B4BU-CF3L].
 23.  See Savannah Berhmann, Jeff Flake: ‘At least 35’ GOP Senators Would Vote to Remove Trump 
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But even if Mr. Flake’s (reported) numerical assessment were correct, 
and even if a private vote might reflect the conscience of the Senate more 
than a public one, does the Constitution allow the Senate to withhold from 
the people the votes of each individual senator? Let us start with the text, 
which provides that the Senate “shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and 
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their 
Judgment require Secrecy.”24 So far, so good—the Senate can decide for it-
self to keep certain proceedings nonpublic. But Article I goes on to say: “and 
the Yeas and Nays of the Members of [the Senate] on any question shall, at 
the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”25 Some 
commentators apparently have read that provision to mean that one-fifth of 
the Senate can compel that individual votes of the senators be made public 
on any particular matter.26 But that is not what the text says. It provides only 
that one-fifth of the Senate can require that individual votes be recorded in 
the Journal, not that the Journal—with the recorded votes—be made pub-
lic.27 That question is governed by the first part of this section of Article I, 
quoted above, that says the Senate (which means a majority thereof) can “in 
their Judgment” keep whatever “Parts” of the Journal they think “require 
Secrecy” from public view.28 So unless the Senate over the years has em-
braced a different interpretation of Article I’s seemingly straightforward 
words (for example that “entered on” would have been understood by any 
observer in 1787 as “publicly available in”), we read the text of the Consti-
tution as not necessarily foreclosing secrecy. 
But the narrow text of particular provisions is not the only source of 
bigger constitutional meaning. Structural principles, often reflected in con-
sistent practices by the branches of government, are relevant too. Indeed, 
where the Senate is acting as or like a court, the concept of precedent has 
special significance, since judicial precedent is generally regarded as more 
pervasively used by courts than legislative and executive precedent are by 
the political branches.29 And here, as far as we are aware, there is no prece-
dent or tradition of keeping the ultimate votes by senators when sitting in 
impeachment shielded from public view, even if certain preliminary 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 25.  Id.
 26.  E.g., Jonathan S. Gould & David Pozen, The Senate Impeachment Trial Could Use A Little 
Secrecy, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2019) https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/senate-im-
peachment-trial-transparency/603463/ [https://perma.cc/WPB6-6ESU]. 
 27.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 28.  Id. 
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impeachment processes prior to the ultimate vote are conducted in private. 
One rejoinder might be that the sample size for presidential impeachment 
trials is too small (i.e., just two Presidents, Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton, 
had been tried prior to the Trump trial) to draw any meaningful inferences. 
But we believe that all 15 or so Senate impeachment trials (mostly for federal 
judges) should count significantly because secrecy of each senator’s vote in 
presidential impeachment is more problematic than for judicial impeach-
ment. So, if the history suggests (and we do not purport to have canvassed 
all of it thoroughly for purposes of this essay) that the Senate has treated final 
votes for impeached federal judges as public matters, then a fortiori (that is, 
with even greater force) the same should be true as to Senate votes on presi-
dential impeachment. 
We say a fortiori because impeachment was given to the Congress—
rather than any other body—to promote accountability. Not just accountabil-
ity for the impeached officers, but accountability for those who would judge 
them. Removing a duly nominated and confirmed federal judge is a big deal, 
but removing a President elected by scores of millions of American voters is 
a much bigger deal. The Constitution sends this signal of gravity by requiring 
that the Chief Justice—our nation’s highest judicial officer—preside over 
presidential impeachment trials even though he does not preside over any 
other impeachment trial. And if the Constitution lodges conviction and re-
moval power in the Senate because it is an elected, politically accountable 
body, then making the votes of senators public is essential. This is especially 
true after the move from legislative to direct Senate election that culminated 
in the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment around the turn of the twen-
tieth century. If the Constitution guarantees that the people of each state can 
be trusted to choose senators, how can the people not be trusted to evaluate 
senators’ actions on perhaps the most important matter ever to come before 
a Congress? 
One set of precedents that we do not think counts for much involves the 
presidential elections of 1800 and 1824, when the House of Representatives 
picked the President—because no candidate had garnered a majority of the 
electoral college—apparently using votes that were not made public. The 
secrecy here is interesting, but not particularly applicable to impeachment 
situations. First, under Article II’s terms for House selection of the President, 
the vote in the House “shall be taken by states [not by individual House 
members], the representation of each state having one vote.”30 Relatedly, 
each state’s one vote can be cast simply by having “a member” of that state 
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present; the state’s entire House contingent need not be in the chamber. 
Third, and importantly, the House is supposed to do its choosing of a Presi-
dent “by ballot.”31 The term “ballot” generally refers to a secret vote. (Web-
ster’s first two definitions of “ballot” are “a small ball used in secret voting” 
and “a sheet of paper used to cast a secret vote.”).32 Throughout history, one 
reason for requiring secrecy has been the prevention of bribery and coercion, 
since no bribe or threat can be effective unless the briber or threat-maker can 
know how the other actor subsequently behaved. Perhaps the Framers were 
particularly worried about corruption or undue influence in the special case 
where no candidate was able to win in the electoral college. 
On top of this, changes in presidential election practice that have made 
it more populist might help distinguish modern presidential contests from 
those in 1800 and 1824. In the early nineteenth century, the people of the 
United States themselves were not thought to have a significant role in pres-
idential selection, so withholding the votes of individual House members 
from the public back then would have been much less problematic. Today, 
given that the same voters who pick House members also pick presidential 
collegians in all the states, perhaps if the House selected a President the in-
dividual votes of each member of every state’s House delegation would be 
made public. 
So precedential and structural considerations do not lend much support 
to secrecy in the impeachment-trial-vote setting, and indeed tend to under-
mine it. 
We close this section by pointing out that maintaining secrecy might, in 
any event, be difficult logistically, even if secrecy were consistent with con-
stitutional values here (which we question). First, even if a majority of sen-
ators today decide to keep secret the Yeas and Nays on President Trump’s 
impeachment trial, there is no barrier to a subsequent Senate making those 
votes public down the road (assuming the votes were recorded in the Journal, 
which, as noted above, requires insistence by only twenty or fewer senators). 
And so, any senators who feel freer to “vote their conscience” because of the 
secrecy of their vote cannot count on that secrecy being maintained for the 
foreseeable future. 
Indeed, even in the short run, secrecy may be hard to maintain. Let us 
imagine the ballots are not made public and President Trump is convicted. 
All the senators who voted to acquit could, if they wanted, publicly attest 
(under penalty of perjury) that they voted in President Trump’s favor. They 
 31.  Id.
 32.  Definition of Ballot, MERRIAM-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ballot 
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could even offer to submit to a lie detector if anyone asks them to, etc. That 
would generate a very strong inference that those senators who do not make 
such public pronouncements of having voted in President Trump’s favor 
were, in fact, those who voted to convict. Thus, again, senators looking to be 
protected by secrecy could not easily rely on such protections. 
Interestingly, perhaps the best argument those who want secrecy could 
make is that it would be good if the vote were kept secret from President 
Trump (who might exact retribution) but not from the voters of each state. If 
that were possible, it might be more consistent with the spirit of the Seven-
teenth Amendment, which sought to reduce the clout political party bosses 
exercised in favor of more populist decision-making.33 Freeing senators from 
party-leader retribution would be nice, but there is simply no way to do that 
without freeing senators from accountability to the people of the states (who 
themselves may prefer to be as intensely partisan as their leaders are in to-
day’s moment), which is the whole point of popular election of senators. 
III. OATHS
As noted near the outset, one of the aspects of Senate impeachment pro-
cesses that incline people to think of the matter in judicial terms is the re-
quirement that senators operate “on Oath or Affirmation.”34 Attention to the 
role of oaths in the Constitution can generally shed light on several issues 
concerning impeachment proceedings.35 The Constitution imposes require-
ments of oath-taking in two instances besides impeachment trials. Under Ar-
ticle VI, members of each branch of federal and state government alike are 
“bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”36 Article II 
separately requires the President, before entering office, to take an oath to 
“faithfully execute the Office of President” and to “preserve, protect and de-
fend the Constitution of the United States.”37 In addition to these three 
 33.  See Vikram David Amar, Are Statutes Constraining Gubernatorial Power to Make Temporary 
Appointments to the United States Senate Constitutional Under the Seventeenth Amendment?, 35 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 727, 741–44 (2008). 
 34.  U.S. CONST. art. I., § 3, cl. 6. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 35.  Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment echoes the relevance of oath and office-holding in the 
context of rebuilding the Union after the Civil War. Section 3 barred from holding future office in federal 
or state government public officials who, bound by Article VI, had rebelled against the Union. Section 3 
also empowered Congress to “remove such disability” by a vote of two-thirds of each chamber. In a sense, 
Section 3 inverts the Constitution’s impeachment provisions. In place of an individualized trial with a 
two-thirds vote required for conviction and removal from office—and the possibility of a bar on future 
office-holding—in one sweep Section 3 disables treacherous office holders from returning to public office 
unless Congress by a two-thirds vote grants an individualized exemption. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
 36.  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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obligations of oath, Article VI also prohibits the imposition of one kind of 
oath: it bars making any “religious test” a “qualification” for holding of-
fice.38
There was regular talk of oaths during the Trump impeachment pro-
ceedings. Impeachment itself is an accusation that the President has failed to 
abide by the obligations the oath provisions of Article I and II impose. Un-
surprisingly, then, President Trump’s accusers regularly claimed that he had 
violated his oath of office.39 On the other hand, the President himself claimed 
that by pursuing what he viewed as baseless charges through an unfair pro-
cess, Democrats in Congress (bound also by the Article VI oath) were the 
ones in violation of the Constitution’s provisions.40
Dueling claims of oath violations do not by themselves get us very far. 
It is easy to accuse political opponents of infidelity to promises. In order to 
make sense of the obligations of oath let us begin by focusing on the Article 
I oath that the Constitution requires of senators when they try impeachments. 
In contrast to the Article II presidential oath and the Article VI oath that all 
public officials take, Article I does not itself specify the content of the oath 
for senators conducting an impeachment trial. Senators must be “on oath,” 
but on oath to do what? Article I does not say. The lack of specificity is not 
likely an oversight on the part of those who wrote and ratified the Constitu-
tion. State constitutions in place before the Philadelphia Convention con-
tained provisions specifying the terms of the oath in state-level impeachment 
proceedings.41 How then to explain a corresponding absence of content in 
 38.  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 39.  See, e.g., Press Release, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Remarks Announcing Im-
peachment Inquiry (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/92419-0 
[https://perma.cc/2EUG-BLHR] (“[T]he actions of the Trump Presidency revealed the dishonorable fact 
of the President’s betrayal of his oath of office.”); Press Release, Cory Booker, Booker Statement on 
House Judiciary Committee Vote to Approve Articles of Impeachment (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1035 [https://perma.cc/W4G6-5MLS] (“This pres-
ident violated his oath and eroded the trust of the American people—it’s our moral obligation as jurors 
in the Senate to proceed in this solemn process in an honorable and deliberate way. No one is above the 
law and it’s our sworn duty to defend the Constitution.”). 
 40.  See, e.g., Brett Samuels & Morgan Chalfant, Trump rallies supporters as he becomes third 
president to be impeached, THE HILL (Dec. 18, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administra-
tion/475238-trump-rallies-supporters-as-he-becomes-third-president-to-be [https://perma.cc/3JMJ-
S7VK] (reporting on statement at rally by President Trump that “With today’s illegal, unconstitutional 
and partisan impeachment, the do-nothing Democrats are declaring their deep hatred and disdain for the 
American voter”); Letter from White House Counsel Pat Cippolone to Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Oct. 8, 
2019) (“As you know, you have designed and implemented your inquiry in a manner that violates funda-
mental fairness and constitutionally mandated due process . . . . Your highly partisan and unconstitutional 
effort threatens grave and lasting damage to our democratic institutions, to our system of free elections, 
and to the American people.”).
 41.  See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780 (“Previous to the trial of every impeachment, the members of 
the senate shall, respectively, be sworn truly and impartially to try and determine the charge in question, 
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the Article I oath? Perhaps Article I should be understood to refer simply to 
the Article VI oath—such that senators, at the outset of an impeachment trial, 
reaffirm their pre-existing duty to “support this Constitution.”42 Arguably 
there is value in this sort of reaffirmation: impeachment trials are rare events 
and it is useful to remind senators (and the public) of the solemnity of the 
occasion and the special obligations it incurs. A more likely inference is that 
the Constitution empowers the Senate itself, through its authority to “deter-
mine the Rules of its Proceedings,”43 to specify the content of the oath for 
impeachment trials. Indeed, the Senate’s own rules, promulgated under Ar-
ticle I, dictate the precise terms of the oath that senators in fact currently take 
in impeachment matters. The Senate first approved an oath for its members 
in 1798, following the impeachment of Senator William Blount.44 The cur-
rent version of the oath the senators take in impeachment trials reflects just 
small changes from the 1798 language and reads: “I solemnly swear (or af-
firm, as the case may be) that in all things appertaining to the trial of the 
impeachment of ——— ———, now pending, I will do impartial justice 
according to the Constitution and laws: So help me God.”45 The Senate—
again exercising its rule-making power—has adopted a separate oath that is 
administered to witnesses who appear before the Senate at an impeachment 
trial.46
In mandating that the senators swear an oath before “sitting” in trial, the 
Constitution signals a shift in their status. When senators try impeachments, 
they are no longer legislators deliberating on bills but rather judges and ju-
rors. The Senate’s own requirement of “impartial justice” underscores the 
significance of the changed role. Legislators engage in all manner of partisan 
activity in order to achieve their preferred political outcomes. As impartial 
judges and jurors, by contrast, senators are meant to set their partisan incli-
nations aside. The super-majority requirement for conviction on charges of 
impeachment47 reinforces the expectation that senators transcend normal 
members of the said court shall respectively be sworn truly and impartially to try the charge in question, 
according to evidence.”); S.C. CONST. of 1778 (“That previous to the trial of every impeachment, the 
members of the said court shall respectively be sworn truly and impartially to try the charge in question, 
according to evidence.”). 
 42.  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 43.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 44.  S. JOURNAL, 5th Cong., 2d Sess. 438-39 (1798). (“That the oath or affirmation required by the 
Constitution of the United States to be administered to the Senate, when sitting for the trial of impeach-
ment, shall be in the form following, viz: ‘I, A B, solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be,) that in 
all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of ——— ——— I will do impartial justice, ac-
cording to law.’”). 
 45.  S. DOC. NO. 113-1, at 194.3 (2014). 
 46.  See S. DOC. NO. 113-1, at 194 (2014). 
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political affiliations. Just as bi-partisanship is needed to override, with a two-
thirds vote, a presidential veto,48 the ultimate check on presidential power—
conviction in the Senate and removal from office—requires more than sena-
tors gearing up their usual political alliances. 
Before the trial of President Trump had even begun, some Republican 
senators stated that they would vote to acquit at the trial’s conclusion.49 Dem-
ocratic members of Congress (along with various commentators) asserted 
that having already made up their minds, these Republican senators could 
not do “impartial justice” pursuant to their oath and they should therefore not 
participate in the Senate trial.50 Similar objections were lodged against Sen-
ate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell after he stated in an interview on Fox 
News that he would be working “in total coordination with the White House 
counsel’s office.”51 Notably, pre-trial verdicts were not limited to Republi-
cans. Senator Elizabeth Warren, for instance, announced before trial that 
given the evidence the House had generated, she would be voting to convict 
and remove President Trump.52
There would clearly be a problem if the jurors in a criminal trial an-
nounced in advance of the evidentiary phase how they planned to vote. But 
can the same be said of senators trying an impeachment? As understood by 
 48.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 49.  See Veronica Stracqualursi, ‘I’m not trying to pretend to be a fair juror here’: Graham predicts 
Trump impeachment will ‘die quickly’ in Senate, CNN (Dec. 14, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/14/politics/lindsey-graham-trump-impeachment-trial/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/6DDD-CS24] (reporting on statement by Senator Lindsey Graham that “I am trying to 
give a pretty clear signal I have made up my mind. I’m not trying to pretend to be a fair juror here.”).
 50.  See, e.g., Marty Johnson, House Democrat calls on McConnell to recuse himself from impeach-
ment trial, THE HILL (Dec. 13, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/474487-rep-demings-senator-
mcconnell-violated-oath-must-recuse-himself [https://perma.cc/Y92E-DQ2A] (reporting on call by Rep. 
Val Demings (D-Fla.) for Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell to recuse himself from the Senate 
impeachment trial); see also James Walker, Senator Says There is Increasing Talk that Mitch McConnell 
Should Recuse Himself from Impeachment Trial, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://www.newsweek.com/senator-increasing-talk-mitch-mcconnell-recuse-himself-impeachment-
trial-1477875 [https://perma.cc/7ZAU-42BR] (reporting on statement by Democratic Senator Sherrod 
Brown that McConnell had “no respect for the institution” of the Senate).
 51.  See Savannah Behrman, McConnell: In total coordination with White House for impeachment 
trial, USA TODAY (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/poli-
tics/2019/12/12/mcconnell-total-coordination-white-house-impeachment-trial/4416518002/ 
[https://perma.cc/6EYQ-W8XS]. 
 52.  See Warren defends saying she’s seen enough evidence to convict Trump, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2020/01/05/sotu-warren-convict.cnn [https://perma.cc/8E2W-
R8EA] (reiterating her position that “evidence enough has been presented” to convict the President). For 
his part, Democratic Whip, Senator Dick Durbin, invoking the oath to do “impartial justice” criticized 
Republican and Democratic senators alike for announcing a judgment before trial. See Veronica Strac-
qualursi, Durbin: Senators have ‘gone too far’ in saying how they will vote before impeachment trial has 
begun, CNN (Dec. 22, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/22/politics/dick-durbin-senate-impeach-
ment-trial-sotu-cnntv/index.html [https://perma.cc/N3NK-RFWJ] (““How can they hold their hands up 
and say I swear impartial justice . . . [W]hen it comes to saying I’ve made up my mind, it is all over . . . 
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courts, the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of an “impartial jury” in a crim-
inal trial means that individuals who have already made up their minds can-
not be seated as jurors.53 But, as noted earlier,54 there are hazards in treating 
a Senate impeachment trial as equivalent to a criminal proceeding and im-
posing a modern Sixth Amendment notion of impartiality upon senators 
sworn to do “impartial justice” in deciding upon articles of impeachment. In 
a courtroom, if one person is disqualified to serve on a jury there is always 
somebody else to perform the role. By contrast, nobody but a senator may 
try an impeachment. Modern notions of Sixth Amendment impartiality, such 
as the requirements that jurors must be drawn from a fair cross section of the 
community,55 and must not be influenced by excessive press coverage56 or 
personally know or have had dealings with the defendant, would quickly re-
sult in no senator being able to serve. One reason it is difficult to apply to the 
Supreme Court the rules of recusal that govern the lower federal courts is 
that if an individual justice is recused there is no substitute to hear and decide 
the case.57 The same would be true if senators were required to step aside. 
The obligation of impartiality in the Senate’s oath cannot mean the same 
thing that the Sixth Amendment requires of jurors because if it did the Senate 
might well be disabled from exercising its “sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments.”58
Perhaps, though, impartial justice is just a commitment to the more gen-
eral Sixth Amendment idea that jurors decide cases solely based on the evi-
dence presented to them after the trial begins. Yet even that requirement is 
not easily exported to the Senate when it tries impeachments. So long as the 
impeachment process in the House occurs publicly (as it does), senators an-
ticipating the trial already know what the evidence (or much of it) is going 
to be. Criminal proceedings are very different. The charging body, the grand 
jury, operates in secret and petit juries have not previewed the case prior to 
trial. Replicating that process would mean that the House conduct its im-
peachment hearings behind closed doors and that senators be sequestered 
 53.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878) (“[A] juror who 
has formed an opinion cannot be impartial.”). 
 54.  See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 55.  See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (“[T]he selection of a petit jury from a rep-
resentative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial.”). 
 56.  See Irvin v Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725 (1961) (overturning jury guilty verdict given the influence 
of the “barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures . . . unleashed against . . . [the de-
fendant] during the six or seven months preceding his trial.”). 
 57.  See John G. Roberts, Jr., 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 9 (2011), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CF8WGZS4]. 
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until trial begins. But it is hard to imagine that the Constitution requires lock-
ing down the Article I branch of government. We should prefer that the 
House conduct its proceedings in public view. And while there might be 
good reasons to sequester jurors during courtroom trials, we should want 
senators to pay close attention to events of national importance as they un-
fold. A sequestered juror suffers a personal inconvenience. A senator who is 
out of the political loop for even a few days cannot responsibly perform the 
duties of office. 
Moreover, emphasizing (as critics of Republican senators did) the re-
quirement of impartial justice is to give attention to the oath the Senate has 
adopted at the expense of close consideration of the oath that Article VI itself 
imposes. Senate rules (providing for an oath or anything else) must, of 
course, be consistent with the Constitution. The duty of “impartial justice” 
under the oath the Senate has adopted cannot therefore require anything of 
senators that would be inconsistent with the Article VI oath or any other pro-
vision of the Constitution. For instance, attention to Article VI suggests that 
there are at least some circumstances in which it is not improper for senators 
to decide to acquit even before hearing the evidence—even if such determi-
nations might strike us as inconsistent with notions of impartiality (including 
from a Sixth Amendment perspective). Consider, for example, if the House, 
out of religious bias, approves vague articles of impeachment accusing the 
nation’s first Muslim President of planning terrorist attacks upon the United 
States in order to install the Christian Vice President to office. The senator 
who, citing the Constitution’s prohibition on religious tests for holding of-
fice,59 promises before trial to acquit might be accused of acting inconsistent 
with the oath to do “impartial justice” but that senator surely holds the Article 
VI oath as a trump card against that accusation. 
Broadening the analysis, the Article VI oath may make relevant consti-
tutional provisions besides those dealing specifically with impeachment. Alt-
hough the requirement that the Senate be “on oath” has no parallel with 
respect to the House when it exercises its “sole power of impeachment,” rep-
resentatives, like senators, are still bound by the Article VI oath. The require-
ment on the part of those who investigate and charge—the representatives—
and those who adjudicate guilt or innocence and impose punishment—the 
senators—to “support this Constitution” may have broader significance than 
deploying the corrective mechanism the Constitution makes available to ad-
dress presidential misconduct. To “support this Constitution” means to sup-
port the entire document. One implication is that it may be perfectly proper 
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for an individual representative or senator to insist upon standards of fairness 
that comport with constitutional requirements in other settings. Thus, for ex-
ample, a representative might choose to vote against articles of impeachment 
on the ground that witness testimony that gave rise to the articles was ob-
tained through torture. Attention on the part of representatives and senators 
to broader constitutional values might be particularly important given that 
courts do not supervise impeachment proceedings. As Justice Kennedy ob-
served (in a different context): “The oath that all officials take to adhere to 
the Constitution is not confined to those spheres in which the Judiciary can 
correct or even comment upon what those officials say or do. Indeed, the 
very fact that an official may have broad discretion, discretion free from ju-
dicial scrutiny, makes it all the more imperative for him or her to adhere to 
the Constitution and to its meaning and its promise.”60
Besides process, other provisions of the Constitution might also take on 
relevance through the Article VI oath. For instance, it would seem entirely 
appropriate for representatives and senators alike to take stock of the fact 
that to remove a President is to shorten the constitutionally-specified term of 
the individual elected through the procedures the Constitution supplies and 
in whom it vests “the executive power.”61 So, too, the role that the Chief 
Justice plays might also be informed by the Article VI oath and the broader 
Constitution for which it stands, as well as by impeachment precedents. Ex-
plaining why he would not break a tied vote on the issue of calling witnesses 
in the Trump impeachment trial, Chief Justice Roberts invoked two consid-
erations. First, he pointed first to an absence of earlier instances of impeach-
ment that were on all fours. The only past examples involved Chief Justice 
Salmon Chase breaking ties on a motion to adjourn and a motion to close 
deliberations during the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson in 1868. Rob-
erts, nuanced consumer of precedent that he is, concluded that “those isolated 
episodes 150 years” were not “sufficient to support a general authority to 
break ties.”62 Second, Roberts invoked the constitutional principle of sepa-
ration of powers. He stated: “If the members of this body, elected by the 
people and accountable to them, divide equally on a motion, the normal rule 
is that the motion fails.63 I think it would be inappropriate for me, an une-
lected official from a different branch of government, to assert the power to 
 60.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 61.  U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 62.  Dan Berman, John Roberts, as Senate trial nears end, finally says he won’t break ties, CNN 
(Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/31/politics/john-roberts-wont-break-tie-senate/in-
dex.html [https://perma.cc/J2BW-JN96]. 
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change that result so that the motion would succeed.”64 In specifying that the 
Chief Justice “shall preside” when the President is tried, Article I does not 
preclude the Chief Justice from breaking a tied vote. But Article VI and ac-
companying attention to constitutional structure—including the differenti-
ated roles of the legislative and judicial branches—give support to Roberts’s 
position. 
Article VI also supports the position of the representative who votes 
against articles of impeachment and the senator who votes to acquit even if 
the evidence demonstrates that a President engaged in impeachable conduct. 
Several Republican senators voted to acquit President Trump even as they 
acknowledged that he had engaged in wrongdoing. That position generated 
widespread criticism, including on the basis that senators who acquit against 
the evidence violate the obligations of their oath.65 One obvious problem 
with these criticisms is that the Constitution does not require the Senate to 
issue a guilty verdict anymore than it requires the House to issue articles of 
impeachment in the first place. Article I gives the House and the Senate the 
“sole Power” to impeach and to try impeachments, respectively.66 A power 
is not a duty. The House is free to ignore impeachable conduct; the Senate 
could even decide to dismiss articles of impeachment outright and hold no 
trial at all. In mandating removal of the President “on impeachment for, and 
conviction of Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and misdemeanors” 
Article II also does not require the Senate to convict whenever charges of 
those offenses are proven.67
Yet there is more to consider than what the Constitution does not say. 
Again, Article VI provides insight. Among Senate Republicans, Marco Ru-
bio provided the most detailed justification for an acquittal against the evi-
dence. He stated that: 
 64.  Id.
 65.  For example, Hillary Clinton issued a tweet that read: “As the president’s impeachment trial 
began, Republican senators pledged an oath to defend the Constitution. Today, 52 of them voted to betray 
that oath—and all of us.” Hillary Clinton (@HillaryClinton), Twitter (Feb. 5, 2020, 3:35 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/hillaryclinton/status/1225171061769195520?lang=en [https://perma.cc/L22X-GVGB]; see also
Kaelan Deese, Hillary Clinton: 52 GOP senators ‘voted to betray that oath’ to defend the Constitution,
THE HILL (Feb. 5, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/481711-hillary-clinton-52-republican-
senators-voted-to-betray-that-oath-to-defend [https://perma.cc/5FDF-MZ7Q]. For a prior member of the 
Senate this is noticeably imprecise language. The Senate’s oath does not involve a pledge to “defend the 
Constitution” and that phrase also does not match the Article VI language but instead is part of the Pres-
ident’s Article II oath. Perhaps, though, Clinton’s formulation gets to a more basic idea: that to do “im-
partial justice” (as the Senate’s oath requires) is to “support [or defend] this Constitution” (as required by 
Article VI).
 66.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
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[F]or me, the question would not just be whether the President’s actions 
were wrong, but ultimately whether what he did was removable. The two 
are not the same. Just because actions meet a standard of impeachment 
does not mean it is in the best interest of the country to remove a President 
from office. To answer this question, the first step was to ask whether it 
would serve the public good to remove the President, even if I assumed 
the President did everything the House alleges. . . . Determining which 
outcome is in the best interests requires a political judgment — one that 
takes into account both the severity of the wrongdoing alleged but also the 
impact removal would have on the nation.68
Applying this “best interest” test, Rubio concluded that removal of 
President Trump was unjustified. He pointed to the availability of other 
mechanisms to check Trump’s conduct, including the upcoming election. He 
also emphasized that removal of the President, “based on a narrowly voted 
impeachment, supported by one political party and opposed by another, and 
without broad public support” would exacerbate “the bitter divisions and 
deep polarization our country currently faces.”69 Accordingly, he said: “I 
will not vote to remove the President because doing so would inflict extraor-
dinary and potentially irreparable damage to our already divided nation.”70
Rubio did not refer to the oath he took in the Senate at the outset of the 
trial or to the Article VI oath but his statement resonates strongly with the 
Article VI command to “support this Constitution.” For one thing, Rubio 
understands that an impeachment verdict should not be the product of polit-
ical business as usual and that senators should exercise judgment in making 
their final decision. Rubio further recognizes that impeachment is not the 
only tool the Constitution gives to address presidential misconduct: a first-
term president can be denied a second term. Rubio’s attention to the nation’s 
best interests, including avoiding further political division, also reflects an 
understanding of constitutional principles broader than the impeachment in-
strument. In the Preamble, “form[ing] a more perfect Union,” “insur[ing] 
domestic tranquility” and “promot[ing] the general Welfare” are among the 
reasons that “We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish 
this Constitution.”71 Consideration of those goals, in the context of a presi-
dential impeachment trial, comports with the Article VI obligation to “sup-
port this Constitution.”72 Of course, attention to the obligations of oath might 
 68.  Marco Rubio, My Statement on the President’s Impeachment Trial, MEDIUM (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://medium.com/@SenatorMarcoRubio/my-statement-on-the-presidents-impeachment-trial-
9669e82ccb43 [https://perma.cc/2ZS9-6TCG]. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id.
 71.  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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reasonably generate a different bottom-line conclusion, as it did for Mitt 
Romney, the sole Republican senator to cast a vote to convict President 
Trump.73
 73.  In his speech explaining his vote to convict the President on the first article of impeachment, 
Romney invoked the oath he took at the outset of the trial: “As a Senator-juror, I swore an oath, before 
God, to exercise ‘impartial justice.’ I am a profoundly religious person. I take an oath before God as 
enormously consequential . . . . [M]y promise before God to apply impartial justice required that I put my 
personal feelings and biases aside. Were I to ignore the evidence that has been presented, and disregard 
what I believe my oath and the Constitution demands of me for the sake of a partisan end, it would, I fear, 
expose my character to history’s rebuke and the censure of my own conscience . . . . I am aware that there 
are people in my party and in my state who will strenuously disapprove of my decision, and in some 
quarters, I will be vehemently denounced. I am sure to hear abuse from the President and his supporters. 
Does anyone seriously believe I would consent to these consequences other than from an inescapable 
conviction that my oath before God demanded it of me?” Sen. Mitt Romney explains why he voted to 
convict Trump, CNN (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/05/politics/mitt-romney-impeach-
ment-vote-remarks/index.html [https://perma.cc/B6XF-CBFR]. Consistent with this personalized under-
standing of and commitment to the oath, Romney recognized that other senators, having taken the very 
same oath, could well vote differently: “As it is with each senator, my vote is an act of conviction. We 
have come to different conclusions, fellow senators, but I trust we have all followed the dictates of our 
conscience.” Id. At the same time, Romney also described the President’s conduct as a violation of his 
Article II oath: “Corrupting an election to keep oneself in office is perhaps the most abusive and destruc-
tive violation of one’s oath of office that I can imagine.” Id.
